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Infrastructure improvements contributed 0.6 percentage 
points to Zambia’s annual per capital GDP growth over 
the past decade, mostly because of exponential growth 
in information and communication services. The power 
sector, by contrast, pulled the growth rate down by 
more than 0.1 percentage points. Improving Zambia’s 
infrastructure endowment could boost growth by up to 2 
percentage points per year. 
   Zambia’s relatively high generation capacity and power 
consumption are accompanied by fewer power outages 
than elsewhere in the region. But Zambia’s power 
sector emphasizes the mining industry, while household 
electrification is about half that in other resource-rich 
countries. Zambia’s power tariffs, among the lowest in 
Africa, are less than half the level needed to accelerate 
electrification and keep pace with mining sector 
demands. 
This paper is a product of the Sustainable Development Department, Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World 
Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at vfoster@worldbank.org and/or cbricenogarmendi@worldbank.org.
In power as in just about every other aspect of 
infrastructure, rural Zambians lag well behind their 
African peers. In a country where 70 percent of the 
population depends on agriculture for its livelihood, this 
represents a huge drag on the economy.
   Zambia would need to spend an average of $1.6 
billion a year over the decade 2006–15 to develop the 
infrastructure found in the rest of the developing world. 
This is equivalent to 20 percent of Zambia’s GDP and 
about double the country’s rate of investment in recent 
years. 
   Closing the country’s annual infrastructure funding gap 
of $500 million requires raising more funds, looking for 
more cost-effective ways to meet infrastructure targets, 
and eliminating the inefficiencies that cause the loss of 
$300 million annually. 
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 nfrastructure improvements contributed 0.6 percentage points to the annual per capita growth of 
Zambia’s gross domestic product (GDP) over the past decade, mostly because of the exponential 
growth of information and communication technology (ICT) services. Poor performance of the power 
sector reduced the per capita growth rate by 0.1 percentage point. Simulations suggest that if Zambia’s 
infrastructure platform could be improved to the level of the African leader—Mauritius—per capita 
growth rates could increase by 2 percentage points per year.  
Zambia’s high generation capacity and relatively high power consumption are accompanied by fewer 
power outages than its neighbors. But Zambia’s power sector is primarily oriented toward the mining 
industry, while household electrification, at 20 percent, is about half that in other resource-rich countries. 
Zambia’s power tariffs are among the lowest in Africa and are less than half the level needed to accelerate 
electrification and keep pace with mining sector demands. Meeting future power demands and raising 
electrification rates will be difficult without increasing power tariffs.  
Improving Zambia’s infrastructure requires reform of its administrative and regulatory processes (for 
example, to remove obstacles to regional trade), as well as substantial physical investments. Because of 
border delays along the north-south corridor (now being tackled by the government) road and rail freight 
crawls along at a pace of little more than 10 kilometers per hour. Lack of effective regulation also allows 
Zambia’s rail operator to charge exorbitant tariffs while providing lackluster service. 
On just about every aspect of infrastructure, rural Zambians lag well behind their African peers. In a 
country where 70 percent of the population depends on agriculture for its livelihood, this represents a 
huge drag on the economy. 
Zambia would need to spend an average of $1.6 billion a year over the decade 2006–15 to develop the 
infrastructure found in the rest of the developing world. This is equivalent to 20 percent of Zambia’s GDP 
(similar to what China invested in infrastructure in the mid-2000s), and is about double the country’s rate 
of investment in recent years. The power sector alone accounts for 32 percent of these spending needs. 
Inefficiencies cause the loss of $300 million (or 4.3 percent of GDP) a year that could be recouped by 
suitable policy and institutional reforms. Underpricing of power and related subsidies cost the economy 
$152 million a year, even though Zambia’s relatively low-cost power could be afforded by most of the 
population at cost-recovery prices. Distribution losses and low rates of collection by water utilities 
represent a further $52 million, while low rates of execution of capital budgets in the road transport sector 
mean that $39 million of budgeted resources are not spent within the financial year. 
Zambia’s infrastructure funding gap of $500 million a year (6.5 percent of GDP) could be largely 
offset by strategic policy choices. Closing the gap requires raising more funds and looking for more cost-
effective ways to meet infrastructure targets. Adopting lower-cost solutions (such as standposts, 
boreholes, improved latrines) to meet the Millennium Development Goals for water supply and sanitation 
could save $218 million a year. Participation in the regional power market could save $160 million. And 
eliminating overengineering in the road sector could save $60 million. Reallocation of disbursements that 
exceed requirements could make an additional $90 million available for more productive uses each year.  
If current levels of inefficiency are allowed to persist, and in the absence of additional funding, it will 
take at least 30 years to meet Zambia’s infrastructure targets at today’s spending levels. With efficiency 
gains, Zambia could reach the targets within 15 years.  
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Zambia’s infrastructure situation is more hopeful than that of many other African countries. 
Infrastructure spending needs—though large—are not beyond the realm of possibility, and Zambia’s 
resource wealth and relatively well-off population provide a more solid financing basis than is available 
to many other countries. Zambia’s infrastructure funding gap—though substantial—can be dramatically 
reduced through measures to stem inefficiencies and lower costs.  
The continental perspective  
The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) has gathered and analyzed extensive data on 
infrastructure in some 40 Sub-Saharan countries, including Zambia. The results have been presented in 
reports covering different areas of infrastructure—ICT, irrigation, power, transport, and WSS—and 
different policy areas, including investment needs, fiscal costs, and sector performance. 
This report presents the key AICD findings for Zambia, allowing the country’s infrastructure situation 
to be benchmarked against that of its African peers. Given that Zambia’s economy is dependent on 
mining, it will be benchmarked against other resource-rich economies in Africa, as well as against other 
African low-income countries. Detailed comparisons will also be made with immediate regional 
neighbors in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). 
Several methodological issues should be borne in mind. First, because of the cross-country nature of 
data collection, a time lag is inevitable. The period covered by the AICD runs from 2001 to 2006. Most 
technical data presented are for 2006 (or the most recent year available), while financial data are typically 
averaged over the available period to smooth out the effect of short-term fluctuations. Second, in order to 
make comparisons across countries, we had to standardize the indicators and analysis so that everything 
was done on a consistent basis. This means that some of the indicators presented here may be slightly 
different from those that are routinely reported and discussed at the country level. 
Why infrastructure matters 
During the five years 2003–07, Zambia’s economic performance was relatively strong; by 2007 it had 
neared the 7 percent growth rate needed to make a significant impact on poverty reduction. The overall 
contribution of infrastructure to improved growth in Zambia in the early 2000s was 0.6 percentage points, 
substantially less than for other countries in the region (figure 1). Zambia’s ICT sector was responsible 
for most of this growth as it added 0.47 percentage points to the per capita growth rate, while the power 
sector reduced per capita growth by 0.13 percentage points. If Zambia could improve its infrastructure to 
the level of middle-income countries in the region, performance could grow by as much as 2.6 percent per 
capita. ZAMBIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 1. Historic and potential future links between infrastructure and growth 
a. Historic changes in growth per capita 
 
b. Potential improvements in growth per capita 
 
Source: Calderon, 2009. 
 
Evidence from enterprise surveys suggests that infrastructure constraints are responsible for about 50 
percent of the productivity handicap faced by Zambian firms, with the remainder being due to poor 
governance, red tape, and financing constraints (figure 2). Power is the infrastructure constraint that 
weighs most heavily on Zambian firms, followed by ICT and transport. ZAMBIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 2. Infrastructure’s contribution to firms’ productivity handicap  
a. Overall contribution of infrastructure  
 
b. Contribution of infrastructure by sector 
 
Source: Escribano and others, 2009 ZAMBIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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The state of Zambia’s infrastructure 
Zambia’s economic activity and population are heavily concentrated along the central copper belt 
running from Lusaka in the south up to Ndola in the north on the Congolese border. Zambia’s poverty 
rates show poverty incidence of less than 40 percent around the main population centers of the copper 
belt, rising to greater than 70 percent for all other regions of the country. Zambia’s power and ICT 
networks mirror this economic geography, with clear north-south backbones and very limited east-west 
spurs (figures 3b and 3c). The road network provides a broader coverage of the country, but the outlying 
segments in the far east and west of the country tend to be those in the poorest condition (figure 3a), with 
traffic flows heavily concentrated on the north-south axis. Zambia is one of the more urbanized countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an urbanization rate of over 50 percent. 
This report begins by reviewing the main achievements and challenges in each of Zambia’s major 
infrastructure sectors, with the key findings summarized in table 1. Thereafter, attention will turn to the 
problem of how to finance Zambia’s outstanding infrastructure needs. 
Table 1. Achievements and challenges in Zambia’s infrastructure sectors 
  Achievements   Challenges 
Air transport  Lusaka plays a significant role in regional air 
transportation 
 
ICT    Increase GSM coverage by addressing regulatory hurdles 
responsible for market-efficiency gap 
Secure competitive access to new East African submarine 
cables 
Power  Substantial and reliable power-generation 
capacity relative to peers 
Raise tariffs to allow for longer-term sustainability of the sector 
Railways  Rail network built to serve needs of mining 
sector 
Address underperforming rail concession and major border 
delays for transit traffic 
 
Roads  Trunk network in good condition and 
maintenance adequately funded 
Shift resources away from overengineered trunk roads toward 
neglected rural networks 
Address major delays at border crossings by embracing trade 
facilitation agenda 
Water resources    Expand irrigated area to cover land with high economic 
potential 
WSS  Relatively high access to piped water and 
flush toilets 
Reduce hidden costs of water utilities 
Reverse increased reliance on surface water and practice of 
open defecation 
Source: Own elaboration based on findings of the report ZAMBIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 3. Zambia’s infrastructure networks follow natural resources 
a. Roads  b. Power 
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Source: AICD Interactive Infrastructure Atlas for Zambia downloadable from 





Zambia has made major progress with its main trunk road network. Despite relatively low road 
densities, analysis suggests Zambia’s primary and secondary networks provide basic regional and national 
connectivity, linking the provincial capitals to Lusaka, and Lusaka to the main international border 
crossings. More than 80 percent of Zambia’s paved road networks are in good or fair condition, on par 
with its middle-income neighbors and well ahead of the typical performance of resource-rich countries in 
Africa (table 2). The establishment of a second-generation road fund in the country resulted in a stable 
allocation of resources to the sector. Zambia is one of the few countries in the region with a road sector 
budget in excess of what is needed to maintain the main road network, and adequate to address the 
rehabilitation backlog (figure 4). During the early 2000s, Zambia spent 3 percent of GDP on the roads 
sector on average—a relatively high allocation. 
Table 2. Zambia’s road indicators benchmarked against Africa’s low- and middle-income countries 
  
Unit  Resource rich  Zambia 
Middle-income 
countries 
Paved road density  km/1,000 km2 
of arable land 
97.6  56.3   146.8 
Unpaved road density  km/1,000 km2 
of arable land 
128.2  95.0   257.8 
GIS rural accessibility  % of rural pop within 2 km from all-season 
road  19.7  16.8  22.9 
Overengineering of network  % of main road network paved despite low 
traffic volumes  15.0  65.0   20.0  
Paved road traffic   Average annual 
daily traffic 
1,408.2  736.6  2,558.3 
Unpaved road traffic  Average annual 
daily traffic 
54.2  45.2  14.9 
Paved network condition  % in good or fair condition  67.9  83.0   82.0 
Unpaved network condition  % in good or fair condition  61.4  25.0   57.6 
Perceived transport quality  % firms identifying as major business 
constraint  27.4  10.6  4.8 
Source: Gwilliam and others 2008, derived from AICD national database downloadable from http://www.infrastructureafrica/aicd/tools/data 
Note: GIS = geographic information system. 
 ZAMBIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 4. Provision for maintenance and rehabilitation  
 
Source: Gwilliam and others 2008 
Challenges  
There is evidence of overinvestment in Zambia’s main road network. About three-quarters of the 
primary and secondary road network is paved, one of the highest ratios among Africa’s low-income 
countries. Traffic density on Zambia’s paved roads is comparatively low—at 736 vehicles per day it is 
about half of the average for resource-rich countries. Indeed, analysis suggests that 65 percent of the main 
road network does not have the traffic levels that warrant paving (meaning fewer than 300 vehicles use it 
per day). 
The rural road networks appear to be neglected. Zambia’s rural road accessibility is poor compared to 
it peers. While 70 percent of Zambians depend on agriculture for their livelihood, only 17 percent of this 
population lives within 2 km of an all-season road—about half the African average. The condition of the 
existing rural networks is exceptionally poor, with only 21 percent in good or fair condition, compared 
with around 60 percent in the relevant peer groups. There may thus be a case for shifting attention and 
resources to the rural networks in the future.  
Zambia has a significant trade facilitation agenda to improve the flow of goods along the north-south 
corridor. Zambia’s strategic location on the north-south corridor makes it an important transit country for 
goods traveling to and from Central Africa and the Port of Durban. The Chirundu border post in the south 
between Zambia and Zimbabwe has been the cause of notorious delays of transit traffic and has 
contributed to keeping transit speeds along the corridor at a pace of not much more than 10 km per hour. 
The government began to address this issue only recently and will open southern Africa’s first one-stop 





Zambia’s rail sector is critical to its mineral-based economy. Rail transport continues to be the most 
competitive for large bulk, time-insensitive commodities, such as Zambia’s copper production. The 
country’s rail network has two operators: (i) the Railway Systems of Zambia (RSZ) serves the north-south 
corridor and connects with the Zimbabwean rail operator for onward service to the Port of Durban; (ii) the 
Tanzania and Zambia Railway Authority (TAZARA) operates an eastward route from the copper belt into 
Tanzania and on to Dar es Salaam. The first of these is an awarded concession, while the second 
continues to be operated directly by the state. 






















































































































































Concessioned (1)/ state run (0)  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  0 
Traffic density, freight, 1,000 tonne-
km/km  469.0   827.0    90.1   406.1   2,426.9   461.3   475.3   901.8  
Passenger density, 1,000 passenger-
kms/km       38.0    91.9    60.3   147.0    32.7   165.6  
Efficiency                 
Labor productivity (1,000 traffic units per 
employee)  121.0   722.1      502.0   3,308.1        
Carriage productivity (1,000 passenger-
km per carriage)      1,176.5    3,285.7          
Locomotive productivity (million traffic 
units per locomotive)         25.1          
Wagon productivity (1,000 net tonne-km 
per wagon)        376.5          
Tariffs                 
Average unit tariff (UT), freight, U.S. 
cents/tonne-km  3.0      5.8   3.9          
Average UT, passenger, U.S. 
cents/passenger-km   1.0     1.0   0.8          
Source: Bullock 2009, derived from AICD railways database downloadable at http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data 
Empty cells denote that data not available.  
Challenges 
Zambian railways’ low traffic densities are well below the viability threshold of at least 2 million tons 
per kilometer for railways of this kind, making it difficult to capture the revenues needed to maintain 
assets. Also, performance for the RSZ is mixed, while TAZARA performance data is largely unavailable 
(table 3). ZAMBIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Low traffic volumes complicate the financial viability of any concession arrangement. In the case of 
the RSZ, the lack of a clear regulatory framework or administrative capacity to supervise the contract has 
made it difficult for the government to provide clear oversight. For example, the RSZ practices 
discriminatory pricing against transit traffic from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to Dar es 
Salaam, charging $2.00 per tonne-km versus the normal tariff of around $0.05 per tonne-km. These tariffs 
reflect an abuse of monopoly power aimed at diverting trade flows from the DRC away from Dar es 
Salaam and toward Durban, with the same concessionaire operating the Zambian rail network and the 
Beit Bridge border crossing from Zimbabwe into South Africa. The high level of these tariffs has a 
distortionary effect on traffic flows and investment decisions along the entire corridor. For example, 
copper exports from the DRC are currently going by road in order to avoid these charges, even though 
they are more suited to rail transportation. Resolving this situation is not simple, and would probably 
require a major renegotiation of the rail concession contract, combined with careful tariff regulation 
thereafter. 
The lack of reciprocal access rights delays rail transit through Zambia and along the entire north-
south corridor. A rail freight journey of 3,000 km from Kolwezi on the DRC border to the port of Durban 
takes 38 days to complete—9 days of travel time and 29 days associated with customs clearance and 
loading and interchange. Freight moves no more than 4 km per hour on average, and the aggregate costs 
of delays along the corridor have been estimated at $120 million per year. The Zambian rail network 
contributes to these delays. Access from one rail system to another is restricted for technical reasons or 
connecting rail operators simply do not have the necessary traction capacity to service existing traffic. 
Poor traffic planning causes undue delays, and operators are not incentivized to provide reliable 
interconnection services. Reducing these delays requires revision of the contractual relationships and 
access rights linking these railways to ensure transparency and fairness in reciprocal track access rights.  
Air transport  
Achievements 
Zambia’s overall air traffic doubled between 2001 and 2007. By the standards of its neighbors, 
Zambia is handling a relatively high volume of such traffic, at 1.46 million seats per year. Its domestic air 
transport sector remains modest and is a fraction of that found in Angola, Mozambique, and Tanzania. 
This may reflect the fact that the most economically significant cities are relatively close together and 
well connected by road and rail. 
Challenges 
Even as overall traffic has increased, connectivity (measured by the number of city pairs served) has 
declined from 35 to 25 in recent years, typical across Africa over this period. Lusaka has relatively good 
intra-African connectivity compared to many other capitals in the region. But the aging aircraft fleet in 
Zambia presents another challenge, and its renewal is slower than in neighboring countries. 
The recent collapse of Zambian Airways puts the future of the domestic market in question. 
Experience from neighboring Tanzania may be relevant in this respect.  Following the demise of Air 
Tanzania, a joint venture was set up to form the private airline Precision Air, with 51 percent ownership 
by Tanzanian interests and 49 percent by Kenyan Airways. The airline has grown substantially, and ZAMBIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Tanzania now has one of the most vibrant domestic air transport markets in Africa, offering competing 
services on all routes.  
Table 4. Air transport 
Country   Angola  Zambia  Tanzania  Botswana  Namibia  Zimbabwe  Mozam-
bique 
TRAFFIC (2007)                
Domestic seats  
(millions per year) 
1.20  0.44  1.87  0.24  0.08  0.24  1.14 
Seats for international travel within Africa 
(millions per year)   0.48  1.46  1.27  —  —   1.11  0.58 
Seats for intercontinental travel (millions 
per year)  0.59  0.11  0.59  —  0.24  0.18  0.09 
Seats available per capita  0.13  0.17  0.9  —   —   0.11  0.09 
QUALITY               
% of seat-km in older aircraft   0.1  19.8  17.1  0  1.1  15.5  16.3 
% of seat-km in newer aircraft   59.6  63.8  79.3  100  79  71.4  57.0 
% of seat-km in aircraft of unknown age  40.2  16.4  3.6  0  19.9  13.0  26.7 
Source: Bofinger, 2009. Derived from AICD air transport database downloadable from http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data 
— = data not available.  
Water supply and sanitation 
Achievements  
Zambia already has relatively good access to high-end water and sanitation solutions (table 5). About 
34 percent of Zambia’s population has access to utility water, whether from private taps or standposts; 
compared with only 24 percent in other resource-rich countries of Africa. Access to septic tanks, at 18 
percent, is far ahead of peer countries.  
As for trends in recent years, Zambia – along with other African countries – is moving fastest with 
intermediate options (figures 5 and 6). The real action in WSS has been in expanding access to wells or 
boreholes and traditional latrines, for an additional 1 percent of the population each year. By contrast, 
coverage of high-end solutions such as piped water and flush toilets has declined slightly in Zambia, 
while growth in standposts and improved latrines has been modest. This pattern is consistent with 
elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. ZAMBIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Table 5. Benchmarking water and sanitation indicators  
  Unit 
Resource 
rich  Zambia 
Middle-income 
countries 
Access to piped water  % pop  12.0  18.3  52.1 
Access to standposts  % pop  12.6  15.6  18.9 
Access to wells/boreholes  % pop  49.0  46.9  6.0 
Access to surface water  % pop  23.7  19.0  13.0 
Access to septic tanks  % pop  1.6  18.1  40.8 
Access to improved latrines  % pop  6.4  1.6  1.4 
Access to traditional latrines  % pop  54.8  53.1  30.4 
Open defecation  % pop  27.6  27.0  14.3 
Domestic water consumption   liter/capita/day  90.3  80.7  187.6 
Urban water assets in need of rehabilitation  %  42.0  42.0  25.0 
Revenue collection  % sales  69.7  68
*  100 
Distribution losses  % production  43.6  44.9  27.4 
Cost recovery  % total costs  55.6  65.4  80.6 
Total hidden costs as % of revenue  %  270.4  236.4  855.2 
US cents per m3  Zambia  Scarce water resources  Other developing regions 
Residential tariff  48  60 
3.0–60.0 
Nonresidential tariff  59  120 
Source: Banerjee and others 2008. Derived from AICD water and sanitation utilities database downloadable from 
http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data 
Note: 
*Average of three largest utilities. 
Challenges 
The share of the population without access to safe solutions is increasing over time (figures 5 and 6). 
Despite doing well at the high end of the coverage spectrum, Zambia does not fare much better than its 
peers when it comes to the percentage of the population relying on surface water or practicing open 
defecation. A full 19 percent of Zambia’s population continues to rely on surface water and as much as 27 
percent of the population continues to practice open defecation. Moreover, trends in household access to 
WSS services from successive household surveys show that the share of the population living in these 
insanitary conditions continues to increase. An additional 0.8 percent of the population each year relies on 
surface water and an additional 0.4 percent of the population practices open defecation. The high health 
risk associated with these practices makes this a very troubling finding. 
Zambia’s water utilities have relatively high levels of hidden costs due to inefficiencies (figure 7). 
First, utilities recover only about two-thirds of the total cost of service provision (when full capital costs 
are taken into account). Second, utilities are collecting only about 70 percent of the revenues owed by 
their customers. Third, about 45 percent of water produced is lost in distribution due to technical and 
nontechnical factors. This poor performance is not atypical of water utilities in other resource-rich 
countries in Africa, even if it lags far behind the performance of middle-income countries in the region. ZAMBIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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The financial value of all these losses, expressed as a percentage of utility revenues, indicates that losses 
are more than twice as high as current sector revenues (236 percent of revenues).  
Figure 5. Growing reliance on surface water  
 
Source: Banerjee and others 2008. 
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Figure 6. Progress in traditional latrines, but an increase in open defecation  
 
Source: Morella and others, 2008 
 
Figure 7. Hidden costs of water utilities  
 





Zambia is endowed with a relatively large amount of cost-effective hydropower. In terms of 
electricity supply, Zambia enjoys a much more favorable position than many of its neighbors (table 6). 
Due to the demands of its large-scale mining sector, Zambia has a relatively large generation capacity and 
power consumption per capita, several times higher than that of other resource-rich countries in Africa. 
Abundant hydro resources allow Zambia to produce electricity at around $0.08 per kilowatt-hour (kWh), 
about half the average cost of electricity production in Africa. 
The national utility Zambian Electricity Supply Company Ltd. (ZESCO) also performs relatively well 
in terms of operational efficiency. In the two key indicators of operational performance, revenue 
collection and distribution losses, ZESCO performs well relative to the resource-rich peer group and near 
the level of the middle-income peer group (table 6). 




rich  Zambia 
Middle-income 
countries 
Installed power-generation capacity  MW/mill. people  43.2  154.9  798.6 
Power consumption  kWh/capita  205.7  771.0  4,479.3 
Power outages  Day/year  14.5  49.8  5.9 
Firms’ reliance on own generator   % consumption  44.9  19.5  10.9 
Firms’ value lost due to power outages  % sales  7.0  3.7  1.6 
Access to electricity  % population  46.1  20.1  59.9 
Urban access to electricity  % population  79.4  50.0  85.2 
Rural access to electricity  % population  28.0  3.5  31.8 
Growth access to electricity  % population/year  2.4  0.3  1.5 
Revenue collection  % billings  81.1  96.5  100.0 
Distribution losses  % production  25.8  12.0  10.1 
Cost recovery  % total cost  53.9  39.1  100.0 
Total hidden costs as % of revenue  %  168.3  93.3  0.1 
U.S. cents  Zambia 
Predominantly hydro 
generation  Other developing regions 
Power tariff (residential at 75 kWh)  2.9  10.3  5.0–10.0 
Power tariff (commercial at 900 kWh)  4.4  11.7 
 
Power tariff (industrial at 50,000 kWh)  2.9  11.4 
Source: Eberhard and others, 2008 Derived from data downloadable at AICD on-line power utilities database 
http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data 
Note: MW = megawatt. 




Access to electricity is only 20 percent in Zambia, less than half of what is found among the relevant 
African peer groups. Power access lags behind in both urban and rural areas, but the gap for rural 
electrification is particularly large—more than 3 percent in Zambia versus 30 percent in the peer groups. 
Not only is access low, but it has also been stagnant over time. Only 0.5 percent of the Zambian 
population is newly electrified each year, compared with 2 percent in the peer groups. While power is 
relatively abundant in Zambia, much of that power is going to the mining sector, leaving relatively little 
for domestic consumption.  
Low power tariffs undermine the sustainability of the power sector. At $0.03–$0.04 per kWh, Zambia 
has some of the lowest power tariffs in Africa (figure 8). Looking across the developing world, Zambia’s 
power tariffs fall below the typical price range of $0.05–$0.10 per kWh. While Zambia’s power 
production costs are low, tariffs are lower. Both historic and long-run marginal costs are close to the mark 
of $0.08 per kWh (figure 9). Tariffs are capturing only about 40 percent of historic costs, and the power 
sector today is living on the investments of the past without making provision for the future. South 
Africa’s recent power shortages demonstrate the dangers of putting off change for too long. Underpricing 
of power creates hidden costs that are as large as the overall level of revenues (figure 10). Given the 
relatively low costs of power in absolute terms, it should be feasible for Zambian consumers to pay full-
cost recovery tariffs. A stronger cash flow for the ZESCO would help to finance the needed expansions in 
generation capacity to keep pace with growing demand and to accelerate the pace of electrification.  
Zambia’s long-term power supply options could be affected by the evolution of regional power trade 
in the framework of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). Zambia already imports a relatively small 
amount of power from neighboring DRC. Plans to further develop the Inga hydropower site in the DRC 
could lead to a large expansion in low-cost hydropower for the DRC, available for export to countries 
such as Zambia. While Zambia has attractive hydropower resources of its own, the long-run marginal cost 
of hydropower generation in the DRC, at around $0.014 per kWh, is about half the equivalent cost in 
Zambia. In the medium term, therefore, Zambia will face a strategic choice between developing more 
domestic hydropower resources versus strengthening its cross-border interconnectors with the DRC. 
Adopting a regional approach could save Zambia $160 million a year in power-supply costs in the long 
term. ZAMBIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 8. Comparison of electricity tariffs across Africa  
 
Source: Eberhard and others, 2008. 
 
Figure 9. Comparison of Zambia’s power tariffs against various cost benchmarks 
 
Source: Eberhard and others, 2008; Rosnes and Vennemo, 2008 
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Figure 10. Hidden costs of power utilities  
 
Source: Eberhard and others, 2008 
Water resources1 
Achievements  
By African standards Zambia is relatively well endowed with water and water storage. The renewable 
water resource per capita is estimated at about 8,700 m
3 per year, well above the Sub-Saharan African 
average of 7,000 m
3 per year. Zambia already has extensive water storage capacity amounting to 9,600 m
3 
per hectare, compared with an average for Sub-Saharan Africa of only 800 m
3 per capita. 
Challenges  
Nevertheless, the country’s water resources are largely underdeveloped. Available freshwater 
supplies are 60 times larger than the current levels of withdrawal for economic consumption. Only 27 
percent of the country’s 6,000 MW of hydropower potential have been tapped. Only 155,000 hectares (3 
percent) of agricultural land are irrigated, and access to safe water remains low. 
Zambia’s current irrigated area could be increased substantially with good economic returns. 
Simulations suggest that with a threshold internal rate of return (IRR) of 6 percent it would already be 
economically viable to develop a further 110,000 hectares of land for irrigation. If the threshold IRR is 
raised to 12 percent the economically viable area for irrigation shrinks to 23,000 hectares. The area with 
irrigation potential is concentrated in the copper belt area and on the shores of Lake Kariba in the 
southwest of the country (figure 11). 
A high degree of spatial and intertemporal variability of water resources creates local scarcity. The 
uneven distribution of water resources across the country, high climatic variability leading to frequent 
floods and droughts, and degradation of water quality from mining discharges on the strategic Kafue 
catchment, result in localized issues of scarcity. From 1997 to 2007, floods and droughts are estimated to 
                                                 
1 This section draws heavily on the recently completed World Bank report: Managing Water for Sustainable Growth 
and Poverty Reduction—A Country Water Resources Assistance Strategy for Zambia.  ZAMBIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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have cost Zambia a total of $13.8 billion in damages and lost outputs, a 0.4 percent loss of growth 
annually. Rainfall variability lowers agricultural growth by 1 percentage point, and regularly leads to crop 
failures and food shortages. Water scarcity also has serious consequences for Zambia’s unique 
environmental resources, on which the country’s significant tourist sector depend. 
Given the wide range of conflicting uses (hydropower, water supply, irrigation, environment), it is 
essential to have a clearly defined basis for allocating water rights among sectors to maximize their 
development impact. To move ahead with important investments in water storage, Zambia needs to make 
further progress in integrated river-basin planning and investment. Beyond large-scale storage 
investments, the development of small-scale storage (as noted above) would do much to alleviate rural 
poverty and enhance the resilience of rural livelihoods. 
Figure 11. Economic potential for irrigation in the Zambia  
 
Source You and others 2009 
Information and communication technology  
Challenges  
Zambia’s GSM coverage is comparatively low by regional standards and well below what the market 
can deliver. Only 53 percent of Zambia’s population lives within range of a GSM signal, compared with 
67 percent among Africa’s resource-rich states and 85 percent of the middle-income countries. Not only is 
the percentage low, but the architecture of the network (recall figure 2c) is very tightly clustered along the 
main economic arteries and almost nonexistent elsewhere. Simulations suggest more than 95 percent of ZAMBIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Zambia’s population could be reached by a GSM signal on a commercially viable basis if measures were 
taken to dismantle regulatory barriers and promote competition to increase the market (figure 12). 
The state-owned telecommunications incumbent, Zambia Telecommunications Company Ltd. 
(ZAMTEL), is characterized by inefficiency and an inability to compete with private mobile operators. 
The operator has become increasingly dependent on state financial support. The ZAMTEL monopoly is 
responsible for the exceptionally high prices of international voice communication that are observed in 
Zambia. In response, the government initiated a privatization process that aims to introduce private 
investment and management practices into the fixed-line sector. 
Table 7. Benchmarking ICT indicators  
   Unit  Resource rich  Zambia  Middle-income 
countries 
GSM coverage   % population  66.9  53.0  85.1 
International bandwidth  Mbps/capita  4.0  4.4  104.0 
Internet  Subscribers/100 people  0.1  0.2  3.0 
Landline  Subscribers/100 people  19.3  8.5  34.8 
Mobile phone  Subscribers/100 people  11.4  20.9  30.0 
Labor productivity  Subscribers/employee  405.1  505.8  756.8 
Quality of service  Faults/100 main lines  82.4  90.8  50.8 
   Zambia  Without submarine cable  Other developing regions 
Price of monthly mobile basket  14.6  11.12  9.9 
Price of monthly fixed-line basket  8.9  13.58  — 
Price of 20-hour Internet package  81.5  67.95  11.0 
Price of a 3-minute call to the United States  5.5  2.59  2.0 
Price of intra-Africa calls, mean  1.2  0.72  n.a. 
Source: Minges and others, 2009 
Note: — = data not available; n.a. = not applicable. 
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Figure 12. Potential for commercially viable expansion of GSM coverage  
 
Source: Mayer and others 2009 
 
Connecting to new East African submarine cables could slash international communication costs with 
competitive access. As with other African countries that lack access to submarine cables, Zambia faces 
even higher costs for Internet and international telecommunications than elsewhere. With the planned 
submarine cables along the east coast of Africa, and the extension of backbone connectivity inland for 
landlocked countries, there is the prospect of a 50 percent reduction in these charges based on experience 
elsewhere (table 8). These reductions will occur if there is competition on the international gateway to the 
submarine infrastructure, otherwise they will feed higher monopoly profits. ZAMBIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Call to the 
United States  Internet dial-up 
Internet 
ADSL 
Without submarine cable  67  1.34  0.86  68  283 
With submarine cable  33  0.57  0.48  47  111 
  Monopoly on international gateway  16  0.70  0.72  37  120 
  Competitive international gateway  16  0.48  0.23  37  98 
Source: Minges and others, 2009 
Financing Zambia’s infrastructure 
Zambia needs to implement an ambitious infrastructure investment agenda over the next decade. In 
order to meet its most pressing infrastructure needs and catch up with developing countries in other parts 
of the world, Zambia needs to expand its infrastructure assets in a number of key areas. The targets 
outlined in table 9 are purely illustrative in nature, but they represent reasonable aspirations. Developed in 
a way that is standardized across African countries, they allow for cross-country comparisons of the 
affordability of meeting the targets, which can be modified or delayed as needed to achieve financial 
balance. 
Table 9. Illustrative investment targets for infrastructure in Zambia 
  Economic target  Social target 
ICT  Fiber-optic links to neighboring capitals and submarine cable  Universal access to GSM signal and public 
broadband facilities 
Irrigation  Develop 23,000 hectares that are economically viable for 
irrigation 
n.a. 
Power  Refurbish 1,700 MW of generation and develop 1,700 MW of 
new generation  
Raise electrification to 24%  
(50% urban and 15% rural) 
Transport  Achieve regional (national) connectivity with good quality 2-
lane (1-lane) paved road  
Provide rural road access to 80% highest value 
agricultural land, and urban road access within 
500 meters 
WSS    Achieve MDGs 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009 
n.a. = not applicable. 
 
Meeting these illustrative infrastructure targets for Zambia would cost $1.6 billion per year over the 
next decade. Capital expenditure would account for 70 percent of this requirement. The country’s power 
needs represent the single largest item and are estimated to be $0.6 billion per year to refurbish 1,700 MW 
of generation capacity and develop a further 1,700 MW of new capacity. The second-largest item is the 
expenditure of $0.5 billion a year for the WSS sector, needed to meet the MDGs. Both transport and ICT 
spending needs are somewhat lower (table 10). ZAMBIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Table 10. Indicative infrastructure spending needs in Zambia, 2006–15 
   $ million per year 
Sector 
CAPEX  O&M  Total needs 
ICT  132  86  218 
Power (trade stagnation)  532   99  631 
Transport (basic)  145  144  289 
WSS  317  154  471 
Irrigation  5  0  5 
Total  1,131   483  1,614  
Source: Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster 2008.  
Note: Figures refer to investment except public sector that also includes recurrent spending. Public sector covers general government and 
nonfinancial enterprises. 
O&M = operations and maintenance; CAPEX = capital expenditure. 
 
This total spending requirement would absorb 19.2 percent of Zambia’s GDP for a decade, with about 
13.2 percent going to investment and 6.6 percent to operations and maintenance (O&M, figure 13). This 
would be a substantial burden for the economy, but is within the scope of what other countries around the 
world have spent on infrastructure during periods of intensive development. As a point of reference, 
China dedicated 15 percent of its GDP just to infrastructure investment during the mid-2000s. So while 
spending at these levels would certainly be very challenging, it is not entirely inconceivable. 
Figure 13. The burden of infrastructure needs  
 




Zambia already spends a sizeable $0.7 billion per year to meet infrastructure needs (table 11). (Due to 
the nonavailability of financial statements from the ZAMTEL, the state-owned telecommunications 
incumbent, these figures represent a lower limit for the level of infrastructure spending in the country.) 
About 65 percent of the recorded total is allocated toward capital expenditure and 35 percent toward 
operating expenditures. Two-thirds of total spending is domestically financed, coming from the pockets 
of Zambian taxpayers and users of utility services. Focusing on infrastructure investment alone, about half 
is funded by the public budget and the remaining half by a range of external financiers—primarily private 
investors and official development assistance (ODA) partners. Zambia receives relatively little 
infrastructure investment from countries outside the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). Private finance goes almost entirely to the ICT sector, while ODA is evenly split 
between the transport and WSS sectors.  
Table 11. Existing financing flows for infrastructure, average, 2001–06 
Sector  $m per year 
O&M  Capital expenditure  Total 
spending 
Public sector  Public sector  ODA 
Non-OECD 
financiers  PPI  Total CAPEX 
ICT  n.a.   n.a.   1  0  89  90  >90 
Power   99  70  2  8  0  81  180 
Transport   99  85  52  6  3  145  245 
WSS  35  67  47  1  9  123  158 
Total  233  224  99  15  101  439  >673 
Source: Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster 2008.  
Note: Due to nonavailability of ZAMTEL financial statements the data represent a lower bound on total spending. 
PPI = private participation in infrastructure; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; n.a. = not applicable. 




Figure 14. Burden of infrastructure spending 
 
Source: Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster 2008. 
 
In terms of GDP, Zambia’s existing infrastructure spending is typical of other resource-rich countries 
in Africa. During the early 2000s, Zambia was spending an average of around 6 percent of GDP on 
infrastructure (figure 14). This is close to the average for resource-rich countries, but well below the 
average of 10 percent for low-income countries in Africa. Thus, relative to African peers, Zambia’s 
existing spending on infrastructure does not look that high. 
How much more can be done within the existing resource envelope? 
There is evidence that some $315 million of additional resources each year could be recovered by 
improving efficiency (table 12). The three largest potential sources of efficiency gains are improving cost-
recovery (particularly in the power sector), improving capital budget execution (particularly in the 
transport sector), and improving various aspects of operational efficiency (particularly in the water 




Table 12. The efficiency gap 
  ICT  Power  Transport  WSS  Total 
Overstaffing  —  —  —  2  2 
Distribution losses  —  6  —  22  27 
Undercollection  —  0  0  30  30 
Undermaintenance  —  —  0  —  0 
Low budget execution  0  2  39  17  57 
Underrecovery of costs  —  152  20  25  198 
Total  0  160  59  96  315 
Source: Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster 2008. 
— = data not available.  
 
Undercharging for power services costs Zambia about $152 million per year (more than 2 percent of 
GDP). As noted above, Zambia’s power tariffs of $0.03–$0.04 per kWh barely cover half of the full 
economic costs of power production. Overall, the national power utility, ZESCO, covers barely 40 
percent of its costs. The associated financial burden is substantial at the macroeconomic level, amounting 
to more than 2 percent of GDP, and is also several times larger than that found in other resource-rich 
countries in Africa (figure 15). Underpricing of water services, though significant in absolute terms and 
substantially higher in Zambia than in other resource-rich countries in Africa, remains less of a 
macroeconomic issue due to the relatively low turnover of the sector, amounting to 0.4 percent of GDP. 
Zambia’s inequitable access to power and water makes subsidized tariffs a highly regressive policy. 
Zambian power consumers are having the full capital costs of their service (implicitly or explicitly) 
subsidized by the state. Given that 84 percent of households with access to power belong to the top 
quintile of the budget distribution—and indeed 99 percent of those with access belong to the top two 
quintiles of the distribution—this amounts to a highly regressive subsidy (figure 16). Though less 
significant in absolute magnitude, subsidies to the water sector are equally regressive in nature since the 




Figure 15. Underpricing in the power and water sectors 
 
Source: Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster 2008. 
 
Figure 16. Infrastructure and income 
a. Water supply 
 




Source: Banerjee and others, 2008. 
 
Interestingly enough, in Zambia those with access to electricity and power (and many of those 
without access) do not face major affordability problems. To evaluate the social feasibility of raising 
power tariffs to cost-recovery levels, an affordability threshold of 5 percent of the household budget is 
used. On this basis, and using data on the magnitude of family budgets, figure 17 illustrates the 
percentage of Zambian households able to afford monthly utility bills at various levels. Thus, a monthly 
utility bill of $2 would be affordable for essentially all Zambians, whereas a monthly utility bill of $12 
would be affordable for only the richest 20 percent of Zambia’s households. 
Purchasing a subsistence consumption bundle at cost-recovery prices would be affordable for the vast 
majority of Zambian households. Taking a cost-recovery tariff of $0.08 per kWh for power and a 
subsistence consumption of 50 kWh per month—which is enough to power four 100-watt light bulbs for 
four hours per day—the monthly power bill would amount to $4.00, which would be affordable for 
almost 100 percent of the Zambian population (figure 17). Even taking a more generous consumption 
allowance of 75–100 kWh per month, a monthly bill based on a cost-recovery tariff would still amount to 
around $7.00, which would be affordable for 70 percent of the population. Given that, as of today, only 
the more affluent 20 percent of the Zambian population have access to electricity, it is clear from the 
analysis that cost-recovery tariffs would be perfectly affordable for this segment of the population. 
Moreover, even if electrification rates were rapidly expanded to reach the middle tranches of income 
distribution, power would remain affordable. Thanks to Zambia’s relatively low-cost energy resources, 
and a population that is relatively well-off by the standards of low-income countries in Africa, power 
















































































Lower/Upper bound cost of  household consumption of electricity Zambia LIC
 
 
Source: Banerjee and others, 2008. 
 
Distribution losses and low collection rates of water utilities are costing the country $52 million a 
year. While Zambia’s power utilities are relatively efficient by the standards of its peers, Zambia’s water 
utilities are relatively inefficient when judged by the same standard (figure 18). Whereas water utilities in 
other resource-rich African countries typically face operational inefficiencies that amount to 0.14 percent 
of GDP, the operational inefficiencies of Zambian water utilities are wasting 0.7 percent of GDP. Just 
under half of this waste derives from unaccounted water, and just over half from undercollection of 









Source: Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster 2008. 
Annual funding gap 
Zambia’s infrastructure funding gap amounts to $0.5 billion per year (or about 6.5 percent of GDP) 
and is mainly associated with spending needs in the power and water sectors (table 13). Almost 60 
percent of the infrastructure funding gap is for power, representing a shortfall of almost $0.3 billion. The 
rest of the gap is largely related to the WSS sector, where an additional $0.2 billion is needed to meet the 
MDGs. No significant funding gap is found for transport, once efficiency gains are taken into account. In 
the case of ICT, the magnitude of the funding gap cannot be assessed due to the absence of ZAMBIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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comprehensive information on existing spending; however, based on the experience of other African 
countries, it is safe to assume that a funding gap for this sector is small or nonexistent.  
Table 13. Funding gaps by sector 
 
ICT  Power  Transport  WSS  Total 
Spending needs  (218)   (631)   (289)   (471)   (1,609)  
Existing spending  90+   180  245  158  673 
Efficiency gains  n.a.   160  59  96  315 
Funding gap  n.a.   (291)   15  (217)   (493)  
Potential for reallocation  0  30  65  0  95 
Source: Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster 2008. 
n.a. = not applicable. 
 
Every year about $95 million more is spent than needed to meet Zambia’s estimated infrastructure 
requirements (recall table 9). Most of this overspending is on the transport sector ($65 million), which in 
recent years is being funded at rates apparently over and above long-term requirements. There is also 
evidence of overspending on O&M in the power sector, due to utility inefficiencies and an overextended 
distribution network. Since there is a large funding gap in this sector, these resources would be better 
diverted to finance power investments. 
What else can be done?  
There are a number of ways of addressing the infrastructure funding gap; filling it with money is not 
the only relevant approach. A number of policy choices relating to technology selection and regional 
approaches to infrastructure development could reduce the gap by lowering the costs of meeting 
infrastructure targets. Alternatively, there is the possibility of taking a longer period of time to meet 
defined goals. 
Adopting lower-cost technologies for meeting the MDG targets for WSS could reduce Zambia’s 
infrastructure funding gap by $0.2 billion. The estimated cost of reaching the MDG targets is based on 
Zambia maintaining its current mix of WSS technologies, which as noted tends to be skewed toward 
higher-end solutions such as private taps. If, instead, the service expansion needed to meet the MDG 
targets was undertaken entirely through lower-end solutions, such as standposts and boreholes, the 
associated cost could fall substantially, by $218 million or almost one-half. 
Eventually, importing power from the DRC through an enhanced SAPP could reduce the funding gap 
by $0.2 billion. Although not feasible at present, in the medium to long term (as the DRC develops the 
hydropower at Inga), a larger volume of low-cost power would become available through the SAPP. 
Since the DRC’s hydropower resources are more cost-effective than those of Zambia, the latter could 
reduce its power-sector development costs substantially in the longer term by moving toward increased 
reliance on power trade, with potential cost savings of $160 million per year. 
Adopting more appropriate standards for paved roads could shave a further $0.1 billion from the 
funding gap. The spending needs for the transport sector assume that regional and national connectivity 
standards will be met by standard asphalt paved roads. But, in practice, it may be possible to reduce costs ZAMBIA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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by adopting more appropriate paving technologies. For example, use of single-surface treatment instead 
of asphalt surfacing would reduce road sector development costs by $60 million per year. 
If it were possible to adopt all of the above policy measures at once, Zambia’s infrastructure funding 
gap would all but disappear. The combined value of these cost-saving policy measures is $453 million, 
which is very close to the funding gap of $493 million. While it may not necessarily be possible to reap 
all of these cost savings in the medium term, this calculation serves to illustrate the power of strategic 
policy choices in ensuring the feasibility of meeting the country’s infrastructure needs. 
Holding spending at current levels but going after efficiency gains would allow Zambia to meet 
identified infrastructure targets in 15 years instead of the notional 10 years from 2006-2015 assumed for 
this exercise. Assuming that Zambia had no means of raising additional infrastructure finance and was not 
able to implement the cost-saving policies described above, the only way to meet the infrastructure targets 
would be to take a longer period of time than the decade that was contemplated at the outset of this 
exercise. If Zambia were able to redress the various inefficiencies identified above, and preserve overall 
spending at current levels, the targets would take 15 years to reach, which is to say they would be 
achievable by the year 2020. Without tackling inefficiencies, the country would take another 15 years, or 
until 2035. 
Zambia’s infrastructure situation is more hopeful than that of many other African countries. For a 
start, infrastructure spending needs—though large—are not beyond the realms of possibility. Second, 
Zambia’s resource wealth and relatively well-off population provide a more solid financing basis than is 
available to many other countries. Third, Zambia’s funding gap—though substantial—can be dramatically 
reduced through a range of policy measures aimed at stemming inefficiencies and lowering costs. In sum, 
notwithstanding the numerous infrastructure challenges that Zambia faces, their resolution looks much 
more tractable than in the case of many African peers. 
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About AICD and its country reports 
This study is a product of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD), a project designed to 
expand the world’s knowledge of physical infrastructure in Africa. The AICD provides a baseline against 
which future improvements in infrastructure services can be measured, making it possible to monitor the 
results achieved from donor support. It also offers a solid empirical foundation for prioritizing 
investments and designing policy reforms in Africa’s infrastructure sectors.  
The AICD is based on an unprecedented effort to collect detailed economic and technical data on African 
infrastructure. The project has produced a series of original reports on public expenditure, spending 
needs, and sector performance in each of the main infrastructure sectors, including energy, information 
and communication technologies, irrigation, transport, and water and sanitation. Africa’s Infrastructure—
A Time for Transformation, published by the World Bank and the Agence Française de Développement in 
November 2009, synthesized the most significant findings of those reports.  
The focus of the AICD country reports is on benchmarking sector performance and quantifying the main 
financing and efficiency gaps at the country level. These reports are particularly relevant to national 
policy makers and development partners working on specific countries. 
The AICD was commissioned by the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa following the 2005 G8 (Group 
of Eight) summit at Gleneagles, Scotland, which flagged the importance of scaling up donor finance for 
infrastructure in support of Africa’s development.  
The first phase of the AICD focused on 24 countries that together account for 85 percent of the gross 
domestic product, population, and infrastructure aid flows of Sub-Saharan Africa. The countries are: 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Under a second phase of the project, 
coverage was expanded to include as many as possible of the additional African countries.  
Consistent with the genesis of the project, the main focus is on the 48 countries south of the Sahara that 
face the most severe infrastructure challenges. Some components of the study also cover North African 
countries so as to provide a broader point of reference. Unless otherwise stated, therefore, the term 
―Africa‖ is used throughout this report as a shorthand for ―Sub-Saharan Africa.‖ 
The World Bank has implemented the AICD with the guidance of a steering committee that represents the 
African Union, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Africa’s regional economic 
communities, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
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Financing for the AICD is provided by a multidonor trust fund to which the main contributors are the 
United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), the Public Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility (PPIAF), Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the European Commission, and 
Germany’s Entwicklungsbank (KfW). A group of distinguished peer reviewers from policy-making and 
academic circles in Africa and beyond reviewed all of the major outputs of the study to ensure the 
technical quality of the work. The Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program and the Water and 
Sanitation Program provided technical support on data collection and analysis pertaining to their 
respective sectors. 
The data underlying AICD’s reports, as well as the reports themselves, are available to the public through 
an interactive Web site, www.infrastructureafrica.org, that allows users to download customized data 
reports and perform various simulations. Many AICD outputs will appear in the World Bank’s Policy 
Research Working Papers series. 
Inquiries concerning the availability of data sets should be directed to the volume editors at the World 
Bank in Washington, DC. 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 